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II. PANEL: RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF AsSOCIATION THROUGH 
MATERIAL SUPPORT PROHIBITIONS AND VISA DENIALS 
A. David Cole" 
I am delighted to be here at the Washington College oj Law, one of 
the nation's leaders in fighting for human rights and educating on 
the subject of human rights. I am also honored to be on a panel with 
representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union and PEN 
American Center. One of my first cases as a young lawyer at the 
Center for Constitutional Rights was working with PEN American 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, J.D., Yale Law School, 1984; 
B.A., Yale University, 1980. 
LEFT OUT IN THE COLD?
Center and the ACLU in defending Margaret Randall. Margaret was
an American-born poet who obtained Mexican citizenship in the
1960s and lived abroad for a long time. She wrote many books very
critical of the United States and when she decided she wanted to
come back, the United States government initiated deportation
proceedings against her for her political views.24 She was accused of
having advocated world communism in her poetry and her journals.
This was not 1954, but 1984. But her case was a holdover from the
guilt by association days of the McCarthy era.
In the 1950s, we were afraid of Communism. We were afraid, in
particular, of the Soviet Union, the world's second greatest
superpower, which was armed with masses of nuclear warheads aimed
at all our largest cities. As a result, we fought the Cold War, engaged
in espionage, proxy wars, and an arms race. We also took aggressive
preventive measures at home. The principal preventive measure of
that period was guilt by association. We made it a crime to be a
member of the Communist Party, and we created a whole
administrative scheme to implement and enforce this notion of guilt
by association.
There were a handful of criminal prosecutions of some leaders of
the Communist Party, and they had a substantial chilling effect. Yet
more effective than the criminal prosecutions were the administrative
mechanisms created to make sure that this theory was infused deeply
throughout society. President Truman issued an Executive Order
that required loyalty inquiry boards to investigate the political
ideologies, affiliations, and magazine subscription practices of
virtually all federal employees. 5 Many private businesses that worked
with the federal government also had to undertake these loyalty
inquisitions. The House on Un-American Activities Committee
("HUAC") held congressional hearings, and encouraged the
development of a partnership between public and private entities in
the name of political repression. The HUAC would "out" people as
communists and then private industry, notably Hollywood, would
blacklist those individuals from getting anyjobs. In the end, millions
of Americans were affected. It is now well accepted that guilt by
association was a gross overreaction adopted in the name of
prevention.
Today, the threat is terrorism, not communism. And as a doctrinal
matter at least, guilt by association is barred by the First and Fifth
24. Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
25. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947).
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Amendments. But we nonetheless see a remarkably similar reaction
in place. Instead of targeting association expressly, the government
targets "material support" for terrorist organizations. But the
essential features of this prohibition are the same. The government
employs an extremely broad criminal substantive standard-material
support-which encompasses any activity in association with a group
classified as a terrorist organization. Giving the organization money
is the most obvious example of material support, but even the
volunteering of one's time also constitutes material support.
We not only have a broad criminal statute,26 but we also have
administrative and public-private partnership schemes for
implementing this prohibition. The Secretary of State, through an
administrative process, designates foreign terrorist organizations, and
the Secretary of the Treasury, through another administrative
process, identifies another list of proscribed terrorist groups, which
now includes over 1,000 names. The Treasury Department also
facilitates public-private partnerships by setting forth "voluntary
guidelines" that charities, foundations, and businesses are
21encouraged to employ when they are doing their business.
Attorney General John Ashcroft called this the "paradigm of
prevention. 2 8 He argued that when you are facing terrorists who are
willing to commit suicide to inflict mass casualties on civilians, it is
not enough to bring them to justice after the fact; we have to prevent
the next terrorist attack from occurring. Of course, we all want to
prevent the next terrorist attack from occurring; no one wants to see
another 9/11. But the measures that the Administration has taken in
furtherance of this preventive paradigm are quite extreme.2 They
include preventive detention. And in my view, the material support
statute is a form of preventive detention.
The material support statutes hold people responsible, not for
what they have done in the past-the material support itself may be
negligible and there need be no showing that it has actually
furthered any kind of terrorist activity- but rather out of the fear
that they or those they support might do something bad in the
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (1) (Supp. IV 2004).
27. Anti-terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based
Charities, 71 Fed. Reg. 63,838 (Dep't of the Treasury Oct. 31, 2006).
28. John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, Remarks at the Council on
Foreign Relations (Feb. 10, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2003
/021003agcouncilonforeignrelation.htm.
29. See generally DAVID COLE AND JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA
Is LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007) (cataloguing compromises on the rule of law
prompted by Bush administration measures in the "war on terror").
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future. As such, these statutes permit a kind of de facto preventive
detention, implemented through the rubric of the criminal law.
The material support statutes raise a host of constitutional
problems, both in terms of how groups and individuals get
designated as terrorist in the first place, and with respect to the
sanctions then imposed on anyone who supports a designated entity.
The initial designation process is a largely secret administrative
process. Groups first learn that they have been designated as a
terrorist group through a notice published in the Federal Register.
Groups and individuals overseas may be listed without any notice or
opportunity to respond whatsoever. Groups and individuals in the
United States are entitled by due process to some notice and
opportunity to respond, but the opportunity is largely a sham; groups
are not permitted to confront their accusers, are not provided a
hearing, and are typically designated on the basis of secret evidence
that they have no chance to see or rebut. Designations are simply
announced, and the government publishes no statement of reasons
or explanation for why any particular entity was designated
A designated entity may bring a challenge to its designation in
court. But it cannot introduce any evidence in that challenge, and it
generally cannot see the government's evidence, which if classified is
presented to the judge behind closed doors and outside the presence
of the designated entity or its lawyers. Not surprisingly, no
organization has successfully challenged its designation as a terrorist
group.
I am currently representing a group that has not yet been
designated but is under investigation for possible designation, and I
will describe briefly the process that we have been through. About
two years ago, the federal government shut down the organization,
froze all its assets, and seized all its documents and records. It did so
without any finding-or even allegation-of wrongdoing. The fact of
the investigation was enough.
Because this is an American group, as noted above, it is entitled to
some notice, and to submit in writing materials in its defense. To
that end, the government produced a short stack of documents that it
said constituted its "administrative record" regarding the
organization. Approximately 95 percent of the documents do not
even name the organization that we are representing. There are
indictments of other organizations, and miscellaneous documents
referring to other organizations. But there is no explanation as to
what these documents have to do with our client, or of what, if
anything, our client is alleged to have done to warrant being placed
2008] 1215
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under investigation. We are left to guess in the dark at the
government's concerns.
But it is worse than that. The government has also informed us
that it is relying on classified evidence that it cannot tell us about. So
we must defend the group without knowing the accusations against it,
and without seeing most of the evidence in the file.
We do have an opportunity to submit whatever we want-in
writing-in our defense. The only problem is that we do not know
what the charges are, what the evidence is, and they have all our
documents. (Laughter) So we wrote to them and said, "We would
actually like to get access to our own documents so that we might
prepare a defense." They replied that the U.S. Attorney sees those,
not Treasury, so you will have to deal with the U.S. Attorney. When
we wrote to the U.S. Attorney, he said, "I do not have any interest in
the Treasury Department and so I am not going to let you see the
documents." So much for due process in the designation of terrorist
3O
groups.
The second set of constitutional issues raised by the material
support statutes relates to the prohibitions on support that are
triggered by a designation. The principal concern here is that
because the prohibition on "material support" is so sweeping, it
effectively imposes guilt by association. An example is another case I
am handling. I represent the Humanitarian Law Project, a thirty-
year-old human rights group in Los Angeles, which has been working
with the Kurds in Turkey for a long time. The Kurds are a much-
abused group in Turkey. The Humanitarian Law Project was working
with them to teach them how to advocate for human rights, for
example, training them in petitioning the United Nations, going to
the Human Rights Committee, and putting forward a case." In
particular, the Project worked with the Kurdistan Workers Party
because it is the principal political representative of the Kurds in
Turkey. In 1997, however, the United States designated the
Kurdistan Workers Party as a terrorist organization. It then became a
crime for my clients to continue to teach the Kurdistan Workers Party
how to advocate for human rights. Even though my clients had no
intention of furthering terrorism, even though they were actually
seeking to discourage a resort to violence by encouraging the use of
30. In May 2007, the government provided us with a DVD containing copies of
the organization's seized records - but it did so under a protective order barring us
from sharing the documents with our clients absent another court order. Thus, the
government's position is that the clients cannot even review their own documents for
their defense without getting specific document-by-document permission.
31. E.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2007).
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peaceful means to resolve conflicts, that is no defense. Material
support is prohibited regardless of its purpose, and is defined to
include all "training," all "expert advice and assistance," and all
"services" of any kind whatsoever. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has declared these aspects of the material
support statute unconstitutional, finding that they are hopelessly
vague and potentially criminalize a wide range of speech and
associational activities.
The material support statutes raise First and Fifth Amendment
concerns. The First Amendment guarantees the right to associate
with groups that engage in both lawful and unlawful activity, as long
as one does not intentionally further their unlawful activities. And
yet these statutes do not in any way distinguish between support that
is designed to further illegal activities and support that is designed to
further legal activities.
Second, these statutes raise concerns of vagueness and
overbreadth. What do the prohibitions on training, expert advice
and assistance, or services really bar? If they are as broad as they
seem, then they are constitutionally overbroad, because they prohibit
virtually all First Amendment activity in support of one of these
organizations. The government tries to avoid that conclusion by
contending that individuals are not prohibiting advocacy "on behalf
of' a designated organization. But at the same time, the government
maintains that the prohibition on providing "services" encompasses
anything done "for the benefit of' the organization. So one can
advocate on behalf of a group, but if it turns out that one was
advocating "for the benefit of' the group, a crime has been
committed. And if one thinks his advocacy is on behalf of, but the
jury finds that it was actually for the benefit of, he may go to jail for
fifteen years.
These laws-imposed in secret designation processes, and carrying
sweeping criminal prohibitions-cause a tremendous chilling effect
throughout the Muslim community. As these laws demonstrate, the
preventive paradigm pushes the government to sweep broadly
because it does not know where the threat lies, and it is so afraid of
the threat that it is willing to impose penalties on a broad spectrum of
actors. I do not think that is a very effective strategy for a variety of
reasons that I would be happy to go into in question-and-answer, but
I am certain that it is an unconstitutional strategy. Thank you very
much.
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